Firms should be working out their strategy in today’s world keeping in mind the geopolitical changes which keeps on affecting the world  economy and social behaviour which  influences the consumption behaviour of the world or a region comprising of group of countries  or a country.  That, therefore, to a great extent affects a firm’s operations within a country or outside as it goes cross border or if their global value chain goes beyond one single country’s border. The management of the firm now need to focus on macro variables around politics, economics, and international relations to define their corporate strategy and do their corporate planning. They cannot stay oblivious to the happenings induced by any bilateral political relationships between countries or multilateral relationships or between communities or any such geo strategic factors that has a potential to affect the equilibrium of a business environment. Intueri, therefore, considers that management consulting to create a business plan or a strategy plan should factor in appropriate hedges or mitigation strategy to combat  the risk or uncertainties induced by such political turbulence and maintain a sustainable growth strategy against all changes. The blog is one in a series that Intueri will keep on publishing on world affairs, country relationships, and more—those  they feel management consultants need to be aware of and to give appropriate consideration while working with clients

Increasing geopolitical fluidity and intensifying strong-state policies increase the risks associated with economic interactions between states. States have always used tools of economic policy and diplomacy to pursue their geopolitical goals. While globalization was ascendant, many believed that economic connectedness—Western companies and consumers benefiting from low-cost manufacturing, which simultaneously pushed forward emerging-economy development—would contribute to a gradual convergence of states’ outlooks and goals, reducing the likelihood of geopolitical tensions. However, confidence in the mutuality of benefits has weakened. This is particularly true among Western countries, where the strongest geo-economic trend of recent years has been the erosion of support for globalization and growing support for protectionist policies. It is notable that two of the states that have traditionally been among the firmest advocates of global economic integration, the United Kingdom and the United States, have seen the most dramatic uncertainties emerge around their trade-related policies.

In today’s increasingly interconnected world, geostrategic risks find themselves at the heart ofshaping corporate decisions. Geostrategic risks can be broadly classified as spanning geopolitical, political, and macroeconomic uncertainties, and these can certainly affect profits for companies. In a May 2016 survey conducted by McKinsey, 84% of executives believed that geopolitical instability will significantly impact global business over the next five years by reducing profitability. Nonetheless, these concerns vary by industry: while financial services reported the highest levels of fears, healthcare and pharma companies voiced the least concerns.

However, despite these growing uncertainties, less than a third of executives believed that their organizations have effectively factored in these risks into their strategies and around 13% have taken concrete actions towards addressing these concerns. These numbers pale in comparison to results regarding cybersecurity and big data; thus, while technology hasmoved to the forefront for companies, geopolitical risks have been largely neglected. A large reason for this is that organizations have not developed effective frameworks for assessing such risks; most steps taken are ad hoc. Furthermore, the majority ofexecutives believe that the methods used are limited in scope (as they remain largely qualitative as opposed to quantitative in nature). From a company’s perspective, it will be increasingly imperative to utilize research to identify global trends, formulate decision-making protocols, and pursue initiatives that avert risk and capitalize on opportunities. As globalization brings the world closer together, organizations need to adapt to a rapidly changing global climate or face the consequences of not responding to current trends.

These geostrategic risks are also relevant to national economies. A Clingendael study from 2015 evaluated the interconnectedness of the Dutch economy and conclusively found that its integration left it particularly vulnerable to shocks from geopolitical developments. The report specifically identified sanctions, national economic policies (such as China’s One Belt, One Road initiative), and political instabilities in East Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Europe as especially pressing for the Dutch. However, the conclusions from this project are applicable to other nations as well. Decision-making processes must incorporate elements of geostrategic analysis in order to be well-informed and comprehensive; while predicting the future may be out of reach, countries can nonetheless (and ought to) identify trends and prepare contingency plans that adequately account for different possibilities. From this perspective, countries are like companies (albeit much larger), in that they both must consider geostrategic risks as increasingly imperative parts of navigating the global economy.

On looking ahead, here are the four biggest developments that could disrupt strategies in the years to come: 

1. The Rise of Nationalist Movements:

As the political scene becomes increasingly jumbled, governments and citizens alike have found it comforting to re-assert the state as a beacon of power and certainty. The resurgence of nationalist movements ranging from Modi’s Hindutva to Trump’s “Make America Great Again” campaign has become a global movement. While the means of re-establishing identity differ from place to place, nonetheless, these movements share an emphasis on establishing group mentalities. However, as a result, non-state actors have suffered as in- and out-groups have been created; prominent examples include the Rohingya in Myanmar. In addition, another concern that arises is the risk of states intervening in the affairs of others in order to advance their agendas or support groups that they believe to be marginalized or mistreated as a result of this consolidation of identity.

2. Superpower Rivalries:

As state-centered politics move to the forefront,previous norms of diplomacy and mutual respect have eroded. The United Nations has found it increasingly difficult to manage relations; thus, nations feel emboldened to transgress previously established rules without fear of reprehension. Especially given the growth of cyberspace as a new sphere of communication and power projection, there are more opportunities for dysregulation. The China-U.S. and Russia-U.S. rivalries have gained prominence as of late, and aggressive pushes for territorial domination have become increasingly common (such as China’s One Belt, One Road movement). In addition, nations like India and Japan have forged strategic partnerships to bolster economic and political agendas. Thus, superpower rivalries have become a reality, and these relationships must be closely monitored in the years to come.

3. Smaller States Gaining Importance:

These rivalries between major powers have in turn generated instabilities that impact smaller states, which also factor into geostrategic risks. Typically, smaller states have turned to the precedent set by rule-based order; however, as previous alliances become more tenuous, they now risk falling under the hegemony of more established powers. Thus, these states now face a difficult decision: to behave like the small states they are “supposed” toproject their own autonomy in the face of adversity. In addition, smaller states oftentimes face the consequences of regional conflicts in neighboring countries. For example, it is estimated that Jordan’s population grew about 25% from 2011 to 2015 due to fleeing from Syrian refugees.

However, smaller states are not just subject to the conditions imposed upon them by larger states. They also occupy influential positions. For example, instability in Libya has spread to neighboring countries in the form of refugees and weapon transactions.

4. The Sphere of Politics and Economics seem to be Merging:

Finally, the geopolitical climate has also shaped the nature of economic interaction, and this in of itself is a source of risk. Economic policy has consistently remained a tool for states to pursue their agendas. However, the means of accomplishing these goals differ for each country. For example, the United States under Trump has looked to protectionism, while China through its previously described One Belt, One Road program has sought to deepen its ties with neighbors. This Chinese push for infrastructure, some critics argue, will exacerbate regional tensions by increasing domestic reliance on a foreign source and perpetuating indebtedness. Furthermore, the spheres of politics and economics are not separate, and it remains highly plausible that domestic tensions could ultimately influence economic policy. In addition, countries ultimately are self-interested actors, and this can lead to conflicts of interest.


Impacts on Global Economy


US-China Rivalry

Growing trade tensions are feared to have a drag effect on other global economies. The US-China rivalry is particularly pressing for 2019. Economists fear that US tariffs on over $250 billion USD of various Chinese goods could damage other industries, because of the global nature of their supply chains. In addition, they will suppress investment amid trade uncertainty. Asides from these economic concerns, US-China relations have also grown tenser on the political front, with the United States expressing support for Taiwan, as well as condemning China’s record over cybersecurity and human rights (such as with the suppression of the Uighurs). In addition, the US hopes to limit Chinese access to dual-use technologies, such as artificial intelligence and high-performance chips, by encouraging countries such as Japan and South Korea to reduce ties with large Chinese tech companies like Huawei. The advent of 5G technologies, where data can be transmitted as much as twenty times faster than in the current 4G system), has also created a new battleground for the United States and China.

Syrian Civil War

In addition, the conflict in Syria has had and will continue to have significant geostrategic implications for the foreseeable future. Turkey, Russia, Iran, the US, and Israel all have significant stakes in the civil war. Russia has firmly backed the regime of Bashar al Assad as a means of extending its influence in the Middle East; however, the Kremlin seeks to avoid direct conflict with Turkey, the US, and Israel. On the other hand, Iran has been more vocal of its support for the President, and will use the Syrian conflict to bolster Hezbollah, its ally in Lebanon, as well as counteract Israel.

On the other hand, while the US and Turkey are both NATO members, they have differing agendas to pursue. The United States is looking to close out its fight against the Islamic State and more broadly, limit Iranian influence in the region (however, this has sparked tensions with Russia). Meanwhile, Turkey will continue to discourage Kurdish action in Syria. Ankara views the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as a terrorist organization, while Washington has relied on the YPG for anti-ISIS backing and leverage against Iran. Overall, the situation in Syria is complex, and the messy linkages between various parties could lead to conflict escalating in 2019.


In a situation like Brexit where firms were facing challenging social-political situations in their home markets, adopting corporate strategy to extreme political uncertainty first requires evaluation of the nature and the scope of uncertainty.When firms perceive a limited level of uncertainty, or uncertainty around economic conditions, they can adopt a hedging strategy. The portfolio of activities will be rebalanced toward those that can survive the political turmoil – whether those are productive activities or transversal functions of a multinational firm, such as human resources or internal control. The firm can reduce the cost of those functions and put up with a drop-in sale. For example, in response to Brexit, Sony decided to maintain a strong presence in the UK but moved its EU headquarters to the neighboring Netherlands.

If business continuity is at risk in fast-growing markets, firms have to consider a shifting strategy: quickly moving a significant part of their activities abroad, starting with those functions that can be shifted at minimal costs. This strategy also implies a reallocation of resources to more secure and stable markets.

Paradoxically, the businesses that will survive and ultimately stand out are those that create certainty for themselves, forging a path depending on how the situation unfolds. In the case of Brexit, a no-deal scenario will almost surely threaten business continuity, and we could expect numerous firms to engage in salvaging or shifting strategies.

Global Outlook

According to the IMF’s Davos report released in January 2019, global growth is predicted to slow for 2018-2019 fiscal year from 3.8% to 3.5%.


This trend can be attributed to various factors.


    • For example, due to rising interest rates, a stronger USD, and greater volatility in financial markets, additional pressure has been placed on emerging-market countries and has contributed to capital outflows. These rising interest rates have stung emerging-market organizations that borrowed from the United States during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 at low rates and led to refinancing of previous debts. These complications have only been furthered due to a stronger USD.


    • In the United States, real GDP growth for the year 2019 has been predicted to drop to 2.5% as a result of its trade war with China, geopolitical tension, and rising oil prices. Similarly, growth predictions for the EU have fallen to 1.9% in 2019 from 2.9% in 2018, mainly due to Britain’s difficulties with Brexit as well as a slowing Italian economy. In China, growth predictions have fallen from 6.8% in 2018 to 6.2% in 2019. (forecasted Chinese growth is at its lowest in 30 years). However, due to rising oil prices, economic activity in the Middle East is expected to rise slightly to 2% from 1.8%. Nonetheless, because of regional conflicts as well as the volatility of the oil market, investors are cautious about their optimism.


    • Key sources of risk to the global outlook are the outcome of trade negotiations and the direction financial conditions will take in months ahead. If countries resolve their differences without raising distortive trade barriers further and market sentiment recovers, then improved confidence and easier financial conditions could reinforce each other to lift growth above the baseline forecast. However, the balance of risks remains skewed to the downside.


    • With momentum past its peak, risks to global growth skewed to the downside, and policy space limited in many countries, multilateral and domestic policies urgently need to focus on preventing additional deceleration and strengthening resilience. A shared priority is to raise medium-term growth prospects while enhancing economic inclusion.


  • In other parts of the world, plans to extend and deepen networks of economic corridors are spurring huge investments in infrastructure. By far the most ambitious is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): launched in 2013, it spans more than 60 countries and involves investment plans totalling a reported US$900 billion. However, there are numerous other such corridors, most of which connect Asia and Europe. They include the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC); the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which links India, Iran and Russia; and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), a joint initiative by India and Japan.

Proponents of these infrastructure plans argue that they will foster peaceful relations by creating new links and patterns of cooperation. However, the ambitiousness of some of these plans has raised concerns that they might exacerbate rather than prevent tension. The geostrategic interdependence they create—both through the physical presence of assets and people on the ground and through patterns of increased indebtedness, which is a potential source of vulnerability for lower-income countries in particular—are more durable and difficult to unwind than mere trade agreements. This raises questions about potential implications if relationships between corridor partners were to sour in the future. 

The geostrategic climate of the modern world has become increasingly difficult to navigate through. However, it is imperative that companies and countries alike factor in modern trends into their decision-making processes. Politics, economics, and society are all intimately intertwined, and these connections will only further manifest themselves in unexpected ways in the years to come.


2018 proved to be a tumultuous year for the region. Some ASEAN countries faced major challenges. For example, Indonesia was struck by disasters multiple times from earthquakes to a tragic plane crash to a devastating tsunami. Elsewhere, countries were navigating their respective democratic paths. Cambodia and Thailand saw its institutions challenged with Hun Sen winning an allegedly rigged election in Cambodia while Thailand’s junta continued to delay elections it promised to hold. While in Malaysia, democracy flourished as its 60-year-old ruling party was surprisingly defeated in the country’s 14th general elections.

As a region, ASEAN has undeniably grown in importance. Southeast Asia is quickly establishing itself as an Industry 4.0 hub. Geopolitically, it has become a valuable site of contention with major powers such as the United States (US) and China looking to establish their influence over the region.

In 2018, trade dominated the political discourse. Largely responsible for this was US President Donald Trump who led the chorus against multilateralism and free trade and called for more insular policies. Earlier in 2018, he implemented tariffs against China and the European Union (EU).

The US remains an important trading partner of the region, with the country being the third largest trading partner with a two-way trade worth US$235.2 billion in 2017. In a statement released after the summit, it was noted that ASEAN was looking forward to improving trade between the two in the coming years.

Meanwhile, ASEAN is leading the charge against such challenges by proposing a trade agreement of its own, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). If the RCEP does go through, it will be one of the biggest trade deals in history as it will encompass 25 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), 45 percent of the total population, 30 percent of global income and 30 percent global trade. Other countries involved in this trade agreement are India, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

However, passing the agreement is a challenge on its own too. Last year, ASEAN and the countries involved missed its fourth deadline to sign the deal despite having negotiations for more than a year.

Thus, as the ASEAN-5 emerge from a difficult 2018, we see a divided growth outlook in 2019. Indonesia and the Philippines, in our view, will be bucking the global trend with accelerated GDP growth, while Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, will all be slowing due to weaker exports and structural constraints.

A key wedge driving the divergence of these two camps is slower external demand and the downcycle in the tech sector which we expect to deepen in H1 2019, hurting the second group of countries more. Structural issues such as deteriorating demographics and high household debt will also leave Singapore and Thailand even more susceptible to a slowdown. In Malaysia, we expect the spillover effects from a weak export sector to be relatively high at a time without policy buffers and commodity prices are falling, posing a potential negative terms-of-trade shock.

In contrast, we expect domestic demand in Indonesia and the Philippines to strengthen, receiving a near-term boost from election-related spending along with an expansionary fiscal stance. For both countries, we also see a continued uptrend in investment spending that is bolstering productivity growth.

Here, we take a look at ASEAN unfolding in 2019 with its international ties with major economies of the world and its outlook for the year ahead.


ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) consists of ten members: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEAN-5 includes Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. Founded to facilitate economic and political exchange in the region, ASEANfeatures the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) between members. In addition, the bloc has established FTAs with other major economic players in Asia and Oceania including Australia and New Zealand (AANZFTA), China (ACFTA), Korea (AKFTA), Japan (AJCEP), and India (AIFTA). Through these FTAs, enterprises can trade regionally with ease, export to new markets, and engage in more simplified import and export protocols. Below, bilateral relations (and general political happenings) between the bloc and specific countries of interest will be detailed more fully:

ASEAN and New Zealand – AANZFTA:

The AANZFTA deal was established in 2010 and offers comprehensive coverage on a variety of topics ranging from trade to intellectual property rights. By the year 2020, up to 99% of Australia-New Zealand trade with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam will be exempt from duties, and ideally by 2025, nearly all trade will be tariff-exempt, which will promote large savings from businesses and encourage activity. In addition, customs protocols shall be simplified,and foreign investments further protected potentially through investor-state dispute settlement proceedings. Combined, ASEAN nations, Australia, and New Zealand account for a total of $4 trillion USD in GDP and represent over 600 million people.

ASEAN and China – ACFTA:

This free trade agreement was established in 2002 and ever since, China has benefited greatly from the deal. Under the Agreement on Trade and Goods, all ten bloc members of ASEAN removed 90% of tariffs on products by 2015.China has remained ASEAN’s biggest trading partner since the establishment of ACFTA, accounting for $346.5 billion USD in merchandise trade (15.2% of total trade volume) in 2015. By 2020, both parties aspire to account for a combined $1 trillion USD in trade and $150 billion USD in foreign direct investment (FDI).

ASEAN will play an increasingly critical role in Chinese geopolitical affairs in the region. In 2017, the U.S. announced the establishment of a so-called “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), which promotes freedom for enterprises and navigation, respect for sovereign rights, and protection of the rule of law. The U.S. is joined by three other major democratic players in the area to comprise a “quad”: Australia, India, and Japan. While this initiative was not explicitly announced with the intention of curbing Chinese presence in the region, it seems plausible that it was partially motivated by such. China has increased its military activity in the Indian Ocean recently as well as placed missiles on contested islands in the South China Sea, which has concerned regional bodies.

ASEAN finds itself in a unique situation, as its members must leverage both sociopolitical and economic interests. Given that ASEAN does not explicitly enforce relations between member and non-member states, it is more likely that individual bloc members will pursue their own agendas when dealing with China and its FOIP rivals. Nonetheless, both sides will continue to vie for ASEAN member support. For example, in May 2018, Prime Minister Modi of India and President Widodo of Indonesia openly discussed the need for transparency and peace in the Indo-Pacific region amidst growing Chinese military activity. Ironically, three months later in August, China and all ten members of ASEAN held a joint maritime military exercise (the first of its kind). Thus, as China and its rivals vie for power in the region, ASEAN will become increasingly important in channeling both sides’ interests. The bloc is notable for its commitment to consensus. However, the China issue could prove to be a point of contention for its members in the upcoming near future.

ASEAN and India (AIFTA):

India retains great geopolitical and economic interest in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean. Nonetheless, considering that India’s strengths lie in domestic manufacturing coupled with ASEAN’s emphasis on reducing ease of exports, the two bodies appear to have misaligned agendas. This has led to both parties experiencing a sort of disenchantment from previous expectations; India hoped to utilize ASEAN as a means of boosting regional influence to counterbalance China, while ASEAN nations looked to benefit from India’s access to new markets. New Delhi remains particularly interested in Thailand and Myanmar as it looks to promote its presence in southeastern Asia; as part of its Act East policy, the three are currently engaged in constructing a Trilateral Highway, a 1360 km long initiative to boost trade and exchange. Plans are underway to have the highway extend further to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam; however, it remains to be seen whether this will fully materialize. Nonetheless, India has focused more on cultivating individual relationships with bloc members as opposed to engaging fully with ASEAN as a collective. Given India’s large resource base and capacities, there is great potential for it to more fully integrate itself into this network for economic and geopolitical benefit. However, given the accelerating pace of China’s influence in the region, effective and methodical decisions must be made soon.

ASEAN and Japan (AJCEP):

Japan remains strongly integrated into the ASEAN community. At the 21st annual ASEAN-Japan Summit in November 2018, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noted his support for the Japanese Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, which emphasizes unity across the region, protection of international law, and promotion of free enterprise. At the conference, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reiterated his commitment to helping develop ASEAN infrastructure by discussing how Japan has exceeded its goal of providing 2 trillion yen in development over the last five years. Interestingly, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, despite increasingly strained relations between the Japanese and Chinese, explicitly extended membership to China. This was seen as an attempt to further foster unity in the region and cautiously regulate Japanese attempts to limit Chinese influence (this development provides an interesting juxtaposition to Japanese membership in the FOIP quad as discussed earlier). Japan thus appears to be more patient in its outlook on Chinese influence and its friendly relations with the ASEAN can serve as a conduit through which to channel its presence in the region.

ASEAN and South Korea (AKFTA):

In 2017, trade volume between South Korea and the ASEAN bloc was valued around $150 billion; in fact, ASEAN is Korea’s second largest trading partner after China. In November of 2018, President Moon-Jae-in reaffirmed his commitment to the so-called “New Southern Policy,” an initiative to reduce Korean economic dependence on the U.S., Japan, and China, and Russia by strengthening relations with southeast Asian nations as well as India. Both ASEAN and Korea aspire to have total trade volume reach $200 billion USD by the year 2020. The reinforcement of these ties is intended to promote economic growth as well as regional stability (particularly with regards to relations across the Korean peninsula). Peace is prioritized on both sides as a means of enabling prosperity.


Both blocs have great potential to set up strong bilateral relations; however, their current relationship can be muddied at times. Several ASEAN members feel belittled by their EU counterparts, which has created tension. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia disapprove of the EU’s standards for agricultural products. Nonetheless, there have been attempts to strengthen ties between the two. On October 19, 2018, the EU-ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting was held in Brussels, which was intended to promote investment, trade, and discuss policy and security issues in the ASEAN fora. In addition, in January 2019, the EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held with the goal of reinforcing their “strategic partnership.”Nevertheless, no formalized large-scale free trade agreements exist between the two. Recently, there have been increased talks of establishing a Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement (CATA); however, this has yet to be fully implemented. Most of the discussion in ASEAN and EU circles has yet to be proven as substantive.

In addition, the EU and Cambodia remain in dispute over the EBA (“Everything but Arms”) agreement. Under this arrangement, imports from developing countries are exempt from duties and quotas when entering into the EU market; however, given Cambodia’s record with human rights under the leadership of Prime Minister of Hun Sen, this privilege may be revoked. This would be a significant blow to the Cambodian economy, as the EU is the country’s largest market (40% of exports, mainly in the garment industry). Experts predict that this stripping of EBA access would lead to a 12% increase in tariffs in the garment sector and an 8-17% increase for footwear, which would levy an additional $676 million USD in taxes on exports. This would prove to be particularly damaging to the livelihood of rural women, who already face much duress in their home country. The EU’s decision on whether or not to suspend EBA privileges could come by August 2020 and monitoring this situation will be critical in the upcoming months.

ASEAN and the U.S.:

The U.S. partnership with ASEAN emphasizes economic integration, maritime cooperation, strong ASEAN leadership, opportunities for ASEAN women, and transnational challenges. ASEAN is the U.S.’s fourth largest export market; as of 2016, the volume of two-way trade was worth $234 billion USD, and the U.S. had exported $27.1 billion worth of agricultural products to the bloc (mostly soybeans, cotton, and dairy). The U.S. has operated under the framework of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA); however, overall, ties with the region have fallen (particularly under the current Trump administration). In 2016, while U.S.-ASEAN trade volume was $234 billion, China-ASEAN trade volume was valued at over $500 billion USD.

As discussed earlier in the document, China-U.S. increasing rivalriesmay substantially impact bilateral relations with the bloc. ASEAN may potentially serve as a buffer to help mitigate the tension; this hypothesis remains to be tested (Pongsudhirak). However, the bloc has remained receptive to growing Chinese expansion (particularly with regards to the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation agreement, which has led to damming of critical stretches of the Mekong River in the name of infrastructural and economic revitalization). Thus, China has seen its stake in the region grow while the U.S.’s has fallen. To quote the Trump administration, “we need ASEAN to do more for us.” In addition, given its “American First” policy, the U.S. has increasingly sought to negotiate individual bilateral terms with each individual economy in the bloc.

Furthermore, despite the decrease in economic activity, the U.S. has increased its military presence in the region. Military expenditures in Asia and Oceania were valued at almost $500 billion USD. This militarization may further weaken the U.S.’s position and create more tensions.

Commodities/GDP Composition:

Top 10 commodities for the year 2016

Top ten commodities for the year 2017

Percentage of GDP by sector in 2017 per ASEAN member

ASEAN has open access to a large amount of arable land (roughly around 60 million hectacres) in addition to large swaths of rivers and forests. Given this abundant supply of natural resources, major commodities from the bloc include rice, sweet potatoes, corn, sugarcane, rubber. Other plantation crops such as tobacco and oilseeds are also popular. Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia combined account for roughly 70% of the world’s rubber production (approximately 3.3 million tons annually). Indonesia and Malaysia also produce around 90% of the world’s supply of palm oil.Finally, aquaculture remains an integral part of the export economy. Thus, overall, given ASEAN’s access to abundant natural reserves, agriculture and food production remain integral to the bloc’s prosperity, particularly for less developed countries such as Cambodia. However, overuse of these resources and concerns with sustainability have become increasingly relevant as of recent, and their effects remain to be seen.

In addition, exports such as electronics, oil, gas, and metals are also significant. More developed countries like Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia have paved the way for these exports. There is a disparity between the exports of richer and poorer members, but increased connectivity both within the bloc and via bilateral relations may help close the gap.

ASEAN 2019 Outlook:

According to market predictions, growth appears poised to slow for the year 2019 in the Asia-Pacific region, given the United States’ aggressive push for economic isolationism, tighter monetary policies for most countries across the board, and growing government deficits.However, within ASEAN itself for 2019, members appear to be hitting a fork in the road. Experts predict that both Indonesia and the Philippines will experience growth, while Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand will see slowing due to decreased demand for tech products, increased debt per household, as well as shifting demographics. On the other hand, Indonesia and Philippines are predicted to grow because of higher government spending and expansionary monetary policy.In addition, elections are on the table in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, which will shape the approaches that these nations take over the course of the year.

Regarding general issues, trade was a strong theme in 2018, particularly given Donald Trump’s crusade against multilateralism and free trade between countries. As a response, ASEAN proposed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which would encompass over 25% of global GDP and involve various strong trading partners including India, China, and Japan. However, the passage of this legislation has been difficult to pass (missed its fourth deadline last year); nonetheless, a major bill is in the works that could transform the global scene.

Also essential to 2019 will be the topic of the South China Sea. This region remains contested by many, as it is a conduit for global trade and is rich in natural reserves (approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of gas lie beneath its seabed). China has looked to expand its presence in this body of water; however, the United States has disapproved of this and attempted to curb its influence. In response, China has extended cheap lines of credit and glamorous infrastructural projects to win over ASEAN member states, which has directly challenged the bloc’s centrality. Some suspect that China has proposed these options in the hope that the debtor’s default, in which case China would assume command of their resources. At the last ASEAN summit, China and the bloc made progress on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea; however, the details of this deal remain unclear and more importantly, it remains to be seen if China will abide by its stipulations.

ASEAN remains a strongly integrated bloc that maintains a complex array of bilateral relations with a host of countries across the globe. Given the accelerated pace of global trade along with growing rivalries and conflicting geopolitical interests, it is difficult to make comprehensive predictions about what the future holds. Nevertheless, it seems likely that ASEAN will come to play an increasingly important role in maintaining balance of power in the region and leveraging various parties’ agendas.